It Isn\u27t About Duck Hunting:  The British Origins of The Right to Arms by Kopel, David B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 6 
1995 
It Isn't About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of The Right to 
Arms 
David B. Kopel 
Independence Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of The Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333 
(1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/10 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
IT ISN'T ABOUT DUCK HUNTING:
THE BRITISH ORIGINS OF
THE RIGHT TO ARMS
David B. Kopel*
To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THEs ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN RIGHT. By Joyce Lee Malcolm. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 232. $29.95.
Almost as long as Americans have been discussing guns and
government restrictions on guns, they have been looking to the ex-
ample set by Great Britain. And almost without exception, they
have misunderstood the legal and social reality of gun control in
Great Britain. Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm's1 new book, To Keep
and Bear Arms, does much to correct the confused American mind,
particularly regarding the right to bear arms in Great Britain in the
latter half of the seventeenth century - a period of internal tur-
moil and repression that culminated in the adoption of a British Bill
of Rights including an explicit right to arms. The British Bill of
Rights is a direct ancestor of the Second Amendment in the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights.
In earlier times, prominent American legal commentators
tended to view the British right to arms as barely, worth the paper
on which it was written. St. George Tucker, author of the American
version of Blackstone's Commentaries2 and the legal commentator
most often cited by the U.S. Supreme Court for a quarter of a cen-
tury,3 claimed that "[w]hoever examines the forest, and game laws
in the British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping
arms is effectually taken away from the people of England."'4
Moreover, claimed Tucker, "not one man in five hundred can keep
a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty."5 William
* Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy Ana-
lyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, University of
Michigan. - Ed.
1. Professor of History, Bentley College.
2. 1 WLIAM BLAcKsroNm, CommENTARIES *143 n.40 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
3. The Supreme Court notes Tucker's role as the first major commentator in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296-97 (1964). He also served as a law professor at
William and Mary, a justice of Virginia's highest court, and a federal district judge. See
CRAIG EvAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERIcAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 13, 31-50, 74 (1993).
4. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *144 n.41.
5. 1 id. at *300.
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Rawle, author of the standard constitutional law textbook 6 used in
American law schools in the second quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury7 wrote that though English subjects had a nominal right to
arms, "An arbitrary code for the preservation of game in that coun-
try has long disgraced them."'8 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story
called the American right to bear arms "the palladium of the liber-
ties of a republic," 9 which served as the ultimate guarantor of all
other rights. He distinguished the British right, which he thought
"more nominal than real." 10 'Tuicker, Rawle, and Story, in disparag-
ing the British right, intended to contrast it with the vigorous Amer-
ican right to arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment. They
wanted to demonstrate the difference between the restrictive Euro-
pean and free American forms of government.
More recently, courts, legislatures, and commentators have
turned the Thcker-Story-Rawle analysis on its head. In the 1960s,
New Jersey enacted the most stringent state-level gun control laws
in the United States." The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected
a constitutional challenge to the controls. The court reasoned that
the American right to bear arms derived from the British right to
bear arms, and, that in modem times, the British right had van-
ished: "[Flor all practical purposes the average citizen cannot law-
fully obtain firearms in Great Britain at the present time."112
Likewise, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in turning aside
an argument that the Second Amendment protected an individual
right to carry firearms, relied on English legal history as
precedent.' 3
6. WILLIAM RAWLE, A Vmw OF T CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825).
7. Rawle declined President Washington's offer to become the first Attorney General of
the United States. Instead, he served as United States Attorney for Pennsylvania.
8. RAwLE, supra note 6, at 122.
9. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1889, at 746 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
10. 3 id. § 1891, at 747.
At the constitutional convention of the new Republic of Texas in 1845, Judge and dele-
gate William B. Ochiltree explained that the convention should not extend the legislature's
power to regulate concealed carrying of weapons to allow regulation of unconcealed carry-
ing, for such regulation might become a prohibition, and "[w]e might be placed in the condi-
tion of the people of Ireland, and a large portion of England, who are denied the right of
having firearms about their houses." WILLIAM F. WEEKS, DEBATES OF THE TEXAS CONVEN-
TION 311 (1846), quoted in Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent
of the Framers of the Bills of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 629, 642 (1989).
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 151-1 to -63. (West 1966) (current version at N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C: 39-1 TO 39-11; 58-1 TO 58-10 (WEST 1982 & Supp. 1994)).
12. Burton v. Sills, 248 A2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968) (quoting Peter Buck Feller & Karl L.
Gotting, The Second Amendment" A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 46, 49 (1966) (altera-
tion in original)).
13. State v. Dawson, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 1968) (citing Sir John Knight's Case, 87 Eng.
Rep. 75 (K.B. approx. 1685)).
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The New Jersey and North Carolina courts obtained their infor-
mation on guns in England almost entirely from an article pub-
lished in the Northwestern University Law Review.14 Unfortunately,
that article was completely incorrect in its assertion that the average
Briton could not lawfully obtain a gun. When Feller and Gotting
wrote the article, a Briton could walk into a store and five minutes
later walk out with an armload of shotguns. Even today, shotguns
are available to almost any Briton without a criminal record, and
rifle and handgun permits are available for target shooting.15
American politicians in search of justifications for American
gun control have also misperceived British gun control laws. Sup-
porters of the U.S. National Firearms Act of 1934,16 which taxed
the transfer of automatic firearms, justified the law in part on the
grounds that gun laws in England were already so severe that, ac-
cording to then Attorney General of the United States, Homer
Cummings, "the use and possession, of every kind of firearm, and
of the ammunition therefor" required police permission and regis-
tration.' 7 In fact, at that time an escapee from a British mental in-
stitution could walk into a gun store, purchase two dozen shotguns,
and stroll away with weapons and ammunition after paying the
cashier, no questions asked. There was no need for police permis-
sion or registration.' 8
Who, if any, of these American analysts has found the truth?
Does the story of the British right to arms offer anything of value to
the modern American gun debate? The academic literature has
heretofore been sparse. My two books on gun control in Great
Britain both focused mainly on twentieth-century gun policy, rather
than the story of the 1689 Bill of Rights and its right to arms.19 The
one British book on gun control shares a similar focus.20 Various
14. Feller & Gotting, supra note 12.
15. Current British gun statutes and regulations are detailed in DAVID B. KoPEL, THm
SAMURAI, THE MoUTIE, AND THE COWBOY- SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CON-
TROLS OF OTHmR DEMOCRACIES? 74-88 (1992). This book was selected as book of the year
by the American Society of Criminology's Division of International Criminology.
16. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934), repealed by IRC, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1
(1939).
17. National Firearms Act: Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934) (statement of Hon. Homer S. Cummings, Attorney
General of the United States).
18. Cummings's mistake derives from his misunderstanding of British law. Cummings
was referring to Britain's Firearm Act of 1920, which did place strict controls on rifles and
pistols. The Act imposed no controls on shotguns. In British law a "firearm" is a rifle or
pistol, while in America a "firearm" can also be a shotgun. This article uses the word "fire-
arm" in the American sense, meaning any kind of gun that uses a gunpowder explosion to
propel a projectile.
19. DAVID B. KOPEL, GUN CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN: SAVING LIVES OR CoNsTnuer-
INO LIBERTY? (1992); KOPEL, supra note 15.
20. CouN GREENWOOD, FI EARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME AND FIRE-
ARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1972).
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law review articles have touched on the history of the British right,
but usually only in a few pages as part of a larger article that is
mainly about the American Second Amendment. 21 Almost all of
the commentators have accepted the claim of the 1689 Convention
responsible for drafting the British Bill of Rights that the right to
arms was a "true, ancient, and indubitable right" of British subjects,
albeit a right subject to various restrictions.22
As the Firesign Theater comedy troupe once put it, "Everything
you know is wrong."3 To Keep and Bear Arms sweeps away over
two centuries of American - and British - misunderstanding of
the British right to arms, providing the first clear picture of what
the right to arms meant to the British of 1689, as well as what it
meant to the Americans of 1791 who drafted the Bill of Rights with
the British experience very much in mind.
Malcolm states her radical thesis in the first paragraph of the
Preface (p. ix). She argues that before 1689, no right to bear arms
existed at all. When the 1689 Convention Parliament decided to
guarantee a right to arms, the Convention chose, for political-tacti-
cal benefit, to pretend that it was reaffirming an "ancient" right to
arms (pp. ix-x). In fact, argues Malcolm, the Convention created
21. See, e.g., David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5
FORDeHAM URn. IJ. 31, 32-35 (1976) [hereinafter Caplan, Restoring the Balance]; David I.
Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DET. C. L.
REv. 789 (1982) [hereinafter Caplan, Right of the Individual]; Lawrence Delbert Cress, An
Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HiST. 22,
25-27 (1984); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 65, 83-86 (1983); Keith
A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the 7ventieth Century: Have
You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 DAYrON L. REv. 5,7-14 (1989); William S. Fields & David
T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL L. REv. 1, 2-23 (1992);
Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty - A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10
N. Ky. L. REv. 63,64-73 (1982); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & Put. POLY. 559 (1986) [hereinafter
Hardy, Armed Citizens]; David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of
the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & Poi- 1 (1987) [hereinafter Hardy, Second Amendment]; Don B.
Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MciH. L. REv. 204, 235-39 (1983) [hereinafter Kates, Handgun Prohibition]; Don B. Kates,
Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CoNsT. COMMENTARY 87
(1992) [hereinafter Kates, Self-Protection]; Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the
Early Republic LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 125,126-33 [hereinafter Shalhope,
Armed Citizen]; Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J.
AM. Hi=T. 599, 602-06 (1982) [hereinafter Shalhope, Ideological Origins]; Robert E.
Shalhope & Lawrence Delbert Cress, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms:
An Exchange, 71 J. AM. H sr. 587 (1984); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed
Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HAsTiNrs CONSr. L.Q. 961,
964-78 (1975).
22. See, eg., Caplan, Restoring the Balanc4 supra note 21; Caplan, Right of the Individual,
supra note 21, at 794-97; Dowlut, supra note 21; Fields & Hardy, supra note 21, at 2; Gar-
diner, supra note 21, at 64-67; Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 21, at 562; Hardy, Second
Amendment, supra note 21, at 7-9; Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 21, at 238-39;
Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 21; Shalhope, Armed Citizen, supra note 21, at 127-28;
Shalhope & Cress, supra note 21; Shalhope, Ideological Origins, supra note 21, at 602-03.
23. FREsION THamR, EVERYTHING You KNow Is WRoNo (Columbia Records 1974).
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the right then and there, for reasons growing directly out of the
political conflict of the previous century (pp. ix-xi).
I. GuNs IN BRITAIN BEFORE THE ENGLISH CIvIL WAR
The story of the British government's concern with arms begins
in the mists of Anglo-Saxon times, when every male aged sixteen to
sixty bore arms to defend the nation by participating in the "fyrd,"24
which, in Anglo-Saxon law, was "the military array or land force of
the whole country."5 Malcolm, however, begins her narrative in
the Middle Ages. Her first chapter summarizes British arms policy
from the Norman Conquest until the seventeenth century. During
this period, the British did not view ownership and use of weapons
as an individual right; rather it was a duty, sometimes an onerous
one, that the government imposed.
Professional police forces did not exist during the Middle Ages;
the government did not create them until the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury in England - and in the United States. Civil defense was the
responsibility of the people. Whenever someone committed a seri-
ous crime, the government required villagers to raise a "hue and
cry," and, upon hearing the call, to bring their own weapons and
pursue the criminal as long as it took to capture him (p. 2). When
the village gates closed at sundown, the villagers guarded the gates,
again using their own weapons, keeping "watch and ward" (p. 3).
Additionally, the government required able-bodied men to assist
the sheriff in suppressing riots or in performing other law enforce-
ment functions, as part of the "posse comitatus. '26
24. ROBERT W. COAKLEY & STETSON CONN, THm WAR OF TmE AMERiCAN REVOLUTION
2 (1975).
25. BLAcK's LAw DIcTONARY 609 (5th ed. 1979).
26. In the United States, the posse comitatus was - and in many states still is - all the
adult males in a locality who would assemble at the command of the sheriff to apprehend
local lawbreakers. 3 STORY, supra note 9, § 1196; Pauline Maier, Popular Uprisings and Au-
thority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q., 3, 3 (1970). Even in the early
twentieth century, Colorado law provided for punishment of anyone failing to join the posse
comitatus. COLO. REv. STAT. § 1836 (1908) (repealed 1971). In June 1977, the Aspen, Colo-
rado sheriff called out the posse comitatus - ordinary citizens with their own guns - to hunt
for escaped mass murderer Theodore Bundy. Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Con-
stitutions and the Right to Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. Cmr U. L. REv. 177,210 n.140 (1982) (citing
RacnARU L~asN,, BuNDY' THE DELImERATE STRANGER 179-82 (1980)).
A typical modem posse comitatus statute is Kentucky's: "Any sheriff, deputy sheriff or
other like officer may command and take with him the power of the county, or a part thereof,
to aid him in the execution of the duties of his office, and may summon as many persons as he
deems necessary to aid him in the performance thereof." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 70.060
(Baldwin 1991).
In recent years, some fringe groups have taken to calling themselves the posse comitatus.
See Judy Pasternak & Stephen Braun, Nichols Brothers Swept Up in Dark Maelstrom of Fury,
L.A. Tuvms, May 31,1995, at Al, A6. They are no more a genuine posse comitatus, and their
misappropriation of the name should not be any more tolerable, than the attempt of some
right-wing extremists of the 1960s to style themselves as "Minutemen."
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All of these law-enforcement duties were primarily local. In ad-
dition to following a hue and cry, the government obligated all able-
bodied male Britons aged sixteen to sixty to serve in the militia.27
Although the law required all men to serve, by the late sixteenth
century it was common for a county to choose a group of men to
receive intensive militia drill in "trained bands" (p. 4). In either the
general militia or the specialized trained bands, the men-at-arms
were freeholders, craftsmen, or other middle-class citizens under
the command of upper-class men of the community.28
In this context, until the seventeenth century, British "gun con-
trol" laws did not intend to disarm ordinary Britons, even Britons
who were not legally free. Rather, weapons controls focused on
forcing Britons to supply their own weapons, and sometimes on
specifying what kinds of weapons were suitable for persons of vari-
ous stations in life (p. 10).
Gun controls, in the sense that modem Americans might recog-
nize, were rare and generally ineffectual. It was illegal to shoot a
gun in or near a town except in self-defense (p. 10). A statute of
Henry VIII prohibited poor people from owning handguns.29 A
1553 decree of Edward VI ordered "all persons who shoot guns" to
register themselves with the local justice of the peace, but a legal
guide for Justices of the Peace in the early 1600s asked "quaere if
this now be in use."'30 In 1569 Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council sug-
gested that the government should centrally store militia arms - a
proposal that aroused such intense opposition that the Council im-
mediately withdrew it (p. 10). The government did, however, main-
tain a monopoly on the production of saltpeter and gunpowder (p.
11), as did many continental governments.
The fact that ordinary Englishmen, rather than a standing army
or foreign mercenaries, 31 defended England was a great source of
27. The U.S. Supreme Court's one major gun control case in the twentieth century recog-
nized this fact by citing historian H.L. Osgood for the proposition that the English militia was
based upon "the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms." United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
28. Pp. 3-5. Ensuring that militia officers, though ultimately subject to the King, would
be local men with local sensibilities became a divisive issue as the seventeenth century
progressed. The issue remained important in eighteenth-century America, as the U.S. Con-
stitution gave Congress ultimate control of the state militias though "reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, ci. 16.
29. Similar issues arise in the current American gun control debate with proposals to
outlaw inexpensive handguns owned mainly by poor people - so-called Saturday-night spe-
cials - current prohibitions on gun ownership in many public housing projects, and propos-
als to impose extremely heavy taxes on ammunition.
30. P. 10 (quoting MCHAEL DALTON, THE CoUNTRY JusncE 93 (London, 1697) (1618)).
31. The issue of foreign mercenaries as a perceived tool of a potentially oppressive gov-
ernment is amazingly persistent. The Magna Charta demanded removal of "all alien knights,
crossbowmen, sergeants and mercenary soldiers." P. 5. The presence of Hessian troops in
the United States during the American Revolution succeeded in further inflaming many
Americans against the Crown. E.g., Tnm DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENcE para. 27 (U.S.
1338 [Vol. 93:1333
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pride to many Englishmen, though they often viewed actual militia
duty as a nuisance, and there are numerous court records of prose-
cutions for failure to perform militia duties or local law enforce-
ment duties (pp. 4-5). When times were peaceful, militia musters
were rare or nonexistent.32
While restrictions on gun ownership in Britain were generally
mild, there were constant efforts to disarm potential subversives.
The government allowed Catholics - viewed with suspicion after
Henry VIII broke with the Papacy and appointed himself head of
the Church of England - to have firearms and other weapons for
home defense, but it did not allow them to keep militia arms in
their homes (p. 11).
In modem America, many gun control advocates readily affirm
the legitimacy of firearms intended for hunting, while arguing that
weapons that are mainly useful for antipersonnel purposes - hand-
guns and "assault weapons," allegedly - should not be in civilian
hands.3 3 The situation in England was just the opposite. The ruling
classes were happy to have a national defense based on a popular
civilian militia, rather than on an expensive standing or mercenary
army. But the idea of commoners hunting was anathema.3 Unlike
in the United States, private aristocratic estates held most English
hunting land, and hunting by commoners was generally illegal.
Still, as Blackstone would later note, the government sometimes
enacted game laws for the ostensible preservation of the game, but
those laws also served to "prevent[ ] ... popular insurrections. '35
1176) ("He [King George III] is at this time transporting large armies of Foreign mercenaries
to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of
cruetly & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most bararous ages, and totally unworthy the
Head of a civilized nation."). More recently, a proposal in the 1994 federal crime bill to hire
Royal Hong Kong Police as American officers - because of their ostensible ability to pene-
trate Asian gangs - provoked strong opposition from many citizens, leading the supporters
of the bill to drop the Hong Kong police from the conference committee version of the bill.
H.R. 3335, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5108 (1993); H.R. CoNF'. REP. No. 694, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 441 (1994) (deleting Hong Kong police from final bill). Interestingly, much of the oppo-
sition came from persons who also opposed the bill's ban on so-called assault weapons - a
sociological fact possibly showing that support for an armed citizenry and fear of a standing-
mercenary national army remain two sides of the same coin. See, e.g., GuN OwERgs OF AM.,
STATUS REPORT ON THE CRimE BiL An GUN BAN para. 9 (1994) (on file with author).
32. P. 7. Militia musters also declined in the United States in the decades following the
War of 1812. KoPEr, supra note 15, at 321-22.
33. COALMON TO STOP GuN VioLENCE 1, 5 (1994) (on file with author).
34. Pp. 11-12. "Hunting" in Britain refers only to the pursuit of foxes, deer, otter, hare,
or mink with hounds. Oscar Wilde described the sport as "the unspeakable in full pursuit of
the uneatable." OSCAR WMDE, A WOMAN OF No IMPORTANCE act I (G. Putnam's Sons
1920) (1894). "Shooting" refers to bird hunting and to target sports. "Stalking" refers to
humans, without dogs, searching for animals to shoot. The usage in this article follows the
American convention: "hunting" means any efforts by humans with guns with or without
dogs to kill wild animals.
35. 2 BLACKSroE, supra note 2, at *412.
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A 1389 law, enacted after a lower-class uprising36 a few years
before, set property qualifications for hunting. Henry VIII out-
lawed conspiracies for the purpose of illegal hunting. Although
some of the hunting laws criminalized possession by poor people of
devices that had no other purpose but hunting, such as hunting dogs
and snares, Henry VIII and Parliament made no attempt to
crininalize possession of weapons, such as bows or guns, that indi-
viduals could use for personal or civil defense.3 7
Malcolm compresses six hundred years of English weapons pol-
icy into her first chapter as she sets the stage for the main topic of
her book: the English Civil War and its aftermath. Malcolm's ap-
proach, though still the best single source available, does not fill in
all the nuances of the various early English statutes as fully as one
might hope. Accordingly, a scholar looking for the full story of the
right to arms from the Norman Conquest to the English Civil War
will need to start with Malcolm but then move on to the various
discussions scattered throughout the legal literature. 38
The greater weakness of Malcolm's coverage of this period is
the scant attention she gives to the reigns of James I and Charles I
in the first three decades of the seventeenth century. As detailed in
Lois Schwoerer's excellent book No Standing Armies,39 these kings
36. In 1348-1349, the plague killed about a third of the British population, which resulted
in a labor shortage, and a greatly improved economic bargaining position for surviving Brit-
ish working people. A 1351 law, the Statute of Laborers, forbade employment of laborers at
wages above the preplague levels. Although employers frequently violated the statute, a
capital tax increase sparked a peasant rebellion in 1381 that soon chose Wat 'lyler as a leader.
lyler led his forces into London, where they forced a meeting with King Richard II. On June
14 at Mile End, the King agreed to T1ler's demands to abolish serfdom, feudal service, mo-
nopolies, and restrictions on buying and selling. The King also agreed to pardon the rebels.
The next day, however, Tyler was killed in a confrontation with the Mayor of Smithfield, and
Richard II ruthlessly repressed the revolt. He then immediately revoked the Mile End
grants. See CHARLEs OMAN, THE GREAT REVOLT OF 1381 (1906).
37. Pp. 12-13. One ancient law even forbade farmers in designated forest areas from
killing deer that ate their crops. P. 14. Under the current interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act, a Montana farmer has been prosecuted for going into his barn to confront (and
eventually shoot) a bear that was eating his sheep. See Ike C. Sugg, If a Grizzly Attacks,
Drop Your Gun, WALL- ST. J., at A15.
38. See, e.g., SuncoMMrrrEE ON THE CONsTrrTTON OF Tim SENATE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., ThE RIGirr TO KnEP AND BEAR ARMs (Comm. Print 1982)
[hereinafter THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMs]; STEPHEN P. HALBROOI, THAT EVERY
MAN BE ARMED: ThE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984). For a citation to
applicable law review articles, see supra note 21.
The scattered discussions of English history in the above sources will mainly interest An-
glophiles and persons interested in the philosophical discussions about armed citizens in
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England. To the extent that the reader is studying the
English right to arms as a clue to the meaning of the American Second Amendment, Mal-
colm's book renders most of the above articles obsolete. Those who attempt to read all of
the above articles will rapidly find that they discuss mostly the same material. One can thank
Malcolm for, among other things, bringing to a new level a debate that has often been stuck
on a narrow body of the same well-known texts.
39. Lois G. SCHWOERER, "No STANDING ARMmsl" THE ANTARMY IDEOLOGY IN SEV-
ENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1974).
The Right to Arms
attempted to raise large standing armies, and, often lacking the
funds to support the armies, ordered private homes to quarter
soldiers at the homeowners' expense, sometimes for years at a time.
Since the lower ranks of the army were generally composed of the
"dregs of society," the quartering of soldiers essentially meant that
these Kings forced British homeowners to support and live with vi-
olent criminals and drunks who happened to be in the employ of
the government.'n
Schwoerer's history helps explain why the British of the later
seventeenth century shared such an intense fear of standing armies
- a fear that was based not merely on political experience, but on
the personal experience of unfortunate homeowners. This fear
then explains in part why the British people felt such great senti-
ment for a popular militia not under the monarchy's control.
Although Schwoerer does not delve deeply into American constitu-
tional history, her work makes it easy to see why the Second
Amendment, which deals with militias and private arms, was placed
adjacent to the Third Amendment, which forbids the quartering of
soldiers in the homes: the Founders designed both Amendments in
large part as checks on a federal standing army.41
I1. Tim ENGLISH REVOLUTION
The bulk of Malcolm's book takes us from the Scottish revolt in
1639 - "the First Bishop's War" - through the English Revolu-
tion, the Interregnum, the Restoration, the Glorious Revolution,
and-finally the Bill of Rights of 1689 and its explicit guarantee of an
individual right to arms. Throughout, the focus is on the struggle
over who would have the ultimate power of force in society -
whether the power should be widely dispersed or under central ab-
solutist control.
In 1639, King Charles I attempted to impose the Anglican Book
of Common Prayer on Scottish Presbyterians. The Scots revolted,
enjoying great sympathy from many English Protestants. Charles
sent the English militia to suppress the rebellion, but he found that
"militiamen forced to fight for an unpopular cause were unrelia-
ble," and that the militia functioned poorly in offensive operations
far from home (p. 17). A lack of military might forced the King to
conclude a treaty with the Scots on unfavorable terms (p. 17). The
costs of war also forced Charles to summon Parliament into session
40. Id. at 11, 22.
41. For example, Joseph Story's Commentaries traced the Third Amendment to abuses
during the reign of Charles I, and a violation of the principle "that a man's house shall be his
own castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion." 3 SToRy, supra note 9, § 1893,
at 747. See generally William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the
Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HAST. 393
(1991).
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to appropriate him money, but a restive Parliament brought forth a
long list of grievances, the Grand Remonstrance. An end to the
gunpowder monopoly was among Parliament's demands and the
King acceded (pp. 17-18).
Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose as to whether the King or
Parliament had final authority over the militia, and it was this dis-
pute that precipitated the English civil war that began in 1641 (pp.
18-19). The antimonarchists eventually won, seated the "Rump
Parliament," and beheaded Charles Stuart. The Rump Parliament
also began to use the militia for new purposes - the surveillance
and disarmament of political opponents (p. 25). As the Rump Par-
liament became increasingly aware of its own unpopularity, it grad-
ually increased weapons controls. A 1659 law ordered all persons
to supply lists of their arms, ammunition, and horses. The Parlia-
ment also offered rewards to persons who informed militia officers
about unregistered items (p. 28).
During the Interregnum, James Harrington wrote The Com-
monwealth of Oceana,42 expressing the conventional wisdom of the
opponents of a standing army. Widely read even a century later,
Harrington also expressed what became the conventional wisdom
of the Founders of the American republic: A free society rests
upon the foundation of small farmers who own their own land. The
virtuous yeoman farmer, bringing his own arms to duty in a popular
militia, is the best security of a free state. Unlike a standing army, a
militia would never tyrannize its native land. Indeed, a militia
could overthrow a despot. And unlike hired mercenaries or profes-
sional soldiers, the militiaman had his own country to fight for and
was therefore the best defender of a free state against foreign
invasion.43
III. THE RESTORATION AND GUN PROHIIMMON
The Rump Parliament proved increasingly unable to mainthin
order, and in 1660, Charles II ascended to the throne, restoring the
monarchy to the great joy of almost the entire nation (pp. 30-32).
The new King set about at once to reform society so that monarchy
would remain supreme forever. Although the King spoke in concil-
iatory terms of tolerance and forgiveness, his actions bespoke an
effort to eliminate competing sources of power. In December 1660,
42. JAMES HARRINGTON, Tim COMMONWEALTH OF OCEArA (1656), reprinted in Tim
POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARIUNOTON (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977). For Harrington's im-
portance to American political theory, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: Tim
REDISCOVERY OF A~mEicAN FEDERALISM 20-22 (1993).
43. HAR INGTON, supra note 42, at 213,314-15,424-25,442-49,454-57, 689-90, 696. Har-
rington's theories had their origins with Machiavelli, as elaborated in J.G.A, Pocock, 'Oce-
ana'. Its Argument and Character, in HARRINGTON, supra note 42, at 43-45, 54-55, 58-59, 70-
71, 131.
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the Privy Council ordered gunsmiths to supply a list of all guns pro-
duced and all gun purchasers within the past six months. Hence-
forth, the Privy Council ordered, the gunsmiths would have to
produce manufacturing and sales lists weekly.44 A few days later,
the King ordered the militia to conduct warrantless searches for
arms and ammunition stockpiles greater than those necessary for
self-defense, "in the house of any person disaffected to us."'45 At
the same time, Charles II began building up the first peacetime
standing army in English history, euphemistically calling its mem-
bers "guards" rather than "soldiers" (p. 45).
Shortly after ordering searches for arms and ammunition stock-
piles in excess of self-defense needs, the King ordered the militia to
disarm all persons "knowne to be of ill principles" - namely
republicans and religious dissidents (p. 45). In March 1660, the
King forbade the transport of arms or ammunition into the country-
side without a permit (p. 45). The government also increased reli-
gious repression that spring, following Charles's advice that "[i]f
you find new Diseases, you must study new Remedies. '46 Later
that year, Parliament plugged the last "loophole" in the gun control
laws; it forbade the import of firearms, ostensibly because imports
were harming domestic gunsmiths. Persons the government per-
ceived as "malecontents, fanatics, and sectaries" were disarmed and
placed under constant surveillance.47 Throughout the nation, gov-
44. Pp. 42-43. A somewhat similar gun registration law was proposed by President
Carter, but rejected by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1978. See 124 CONG. REC.
16,653 (1978). For the proposed regulations, see 43 Fed. Reg. 11,802 (1978) (to be codified at
27 C.F.R. § 178.131(c)). "Brady II," the comprehensive gun control bill currently being
pushed by Handgun Control, Inc., also proposes total firearms registration. See H.R. 3932,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
45. P. 43. Chicago Housing Authority police conducted warrantless house-to-house gun
searches in public housing projects, until a federal court ordered them to desist. Pratt v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. II. 1994). According to the court, "These
'sweeps' were conducted by searching entire apartment units, including closets, drawers, re-
frigerators, cabinets, and personal effects." Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 793. The police justified the
warrantless searches because gunfire in the area created "exigent circumstances." Pratt, 848
F. Supp. at 794. Exigent circumstances arise when there is an immediate threat to life or
imminent destruction of evidence thus allowing an exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). As the Pratt court
noted, however, not one of the searches in question took place within 48 hours of the shoot-
ing activity. Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 792.
Ross Perot and Richard Wigod, the president of the Los Angeles County Medical Associ-
ation, have also proposed warrantless gun searches. Paul Cotton, CDC Investigators Explore
New Territory in Aftermath of Unrest in Los Angeles, 267 JAMA 3001 (1992) (suggesting a
"military attack" on ghetto areas and encouraging police to "make a sweep through those
neighborhoods [and] take all the weapons [they] can find"); Donald Lambro, Quayle Lands
First Major Hit on Perot WAsH. TWMEs, June 13, 1992, at Al.
46. P. 49. The King's quote suggests that governmental efforts to ban guns under the
rhetoric of "public health" are perhaps not so novel as might first be thought.
47. Pp. 47-49. American gun control advocates have sometimes enjoyed a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the American firearms industry. The Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
618, 82 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1988)), which outlawed the
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ermnent forces tore down town walls and destroyed target ranges
for both bows and guns (pp. 51-52).
Charles had been following a policy of disarmament "by succes-
sive steps" with "a train of enterprizes. ' 48 But despite the prohibi-
tions Charles had enacted, politically and religiously correct
subjects were still allowed to own registered guns. This situation
changed, however, with the Game Act of 1671.49 The initiative for
the Act came from Parliament, rather than the King, but he insisted
that it be vigorously enforced (p. 56).
Although the parliamentary record on the Game Act is obscure,
it attracted little controversy during its enactment because there
was apparently an increasing problem of rural violence as common
people resisted the increasing pace of aristocratic enclosure of for-
import of firearms not deemed "particularly suitable for sporting purposes," grew out of the
American gun industry's efforts in the early 1960s to receive protection from "cheap foreign
guns," namely World War II surplus bolt-action rifles that were being sold at bargain prices
as Western European armies moved up to more sophisticated guns.
The Bush administration's 1989 ban on the import of "assault weapons" - guns which
had earlier been approved for import as "sporting" weapons - enjoyed a great deal of quiet
support from the American gun industry, which disliked the competition offered by inexpen-
sive Chinese rifles.
48. P. 54. In this regard, the King foreshadowed the strategies of the major American
gun control lobby, which has advocated gradual steps rather than an all-at-once approach to
outlawing civilian handguns. The National Council to Control Handguns' founding chair
Nelson Shields explained his strategy for prohibition:
The first problem is to slow down the increasing number of handguns being produced
and sold in this country. The second problem is to get handguns registered. And the
final problem is to make possession of all handguns and all handgun ammunition -
except for the military, police, licensed security guards, licensed sporting clubs, and li-
censed gun collectors - totally illegal.
Richard Harris, A Reporter at Large: Handguns, NEw YORKER, July 26, 1976, at 53, 58.
Although HCI sometimes claims it no longer subscribes to Shields's prohibitionist goal, HCI
has opposed changing the laws in Chicago and Washington, D.C. that prohibit the acquisition
of handguns. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Handgun Control, Inc. at 2, Kalodimos v. Morton
Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984) (defending City of Morton Grove's handgun prohibition as
"narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government interest"); HANDGUN CONTROL, lc.,
* HANDGUN CONTROL (Washington, D.C., undated brochure) ("We successfully defended the
Washington, D.C., handgun law in the courts."). The D.C. law can be found at D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-2311 to -2312 (1981).
Following a similar strategy, former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy
explained that his goal of complete civilian disarmament cannot be accomplished all at once:
"it will be a gradual thing, to reduce the number of guns in the hands of criminals when
private citizens will see the wisdom of a national policy of disarmament of the citizens."
"Saturday Night Special" Handguns, S. 2507: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1971)
(statement of Patrick V. Murphy, Commissioner of Police, New York City).
49. This bill to disarm the vast majority of the British population bore the innocent title
"An Act for the better Preservation of the Game, and for Securing Warrens not Inclosed,
and the several Fishings of this Realm." P. 69. The use of dishonest "pro-sports" titles in
weapons prohibition legislation remains a viable tactic. A 1994 Congressional bill that out-
lawed approximately 200 rifles, shotguns, and pistols by dubbing them "semi-automatic as-
sault weapons" was titled the "Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act,"
despite the fact that the Act added not an iota of legal protection to the status of the guns
that the Act identified as "sporting" weapons. See H.R. 4296, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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merly open, common fields (p. 67). The Act authorized all persons
at the rank of esquire or above to appoint a gamekeeper for their
estates who would be empowered to confiscate all hunting devices
from persons who did not have an income derived from land of at
least one hundred pounds a year. For the first time in English law,
Parliament treated guns like forbidden devices - such as traps -
useable only for hunting. As a result less than one percent of the
people in rural areas, as well as the many wealthy but landless
urbanites, were forbidden to hunt and to possess firearms and bows.
Trial was before a single justice of the peace, and the testimony of a
single witness was sufficient to convict (pp. 70-75). The vast major-
ity of Englishmen were now forbidden to kill a rabbit on their own
land or to own a gun for protection.50 The Game Act's purported
concern with poaching as a pretext for widespread gun prohibition
was implausible. Poachers rarely used seventeenth-century fire-
arms, whose loud report would attract attention and whose large
size - even for handguns - made them awkward to carry and
very difficult to conceal.5 1
One of the great weaknesses of most previous analyses of gun
laws in different countries has been their heavy reliance on statu-
tory materials. But as Malcolm explains, she is not writing solely a
traditional legal history (p. xi) using only what Robert Gordon calls
"the mandarin materials" of written legal opinions, statutes, and re-
corded legislative debates.52 Malcolm looks as widely as possible at
the materials of social history, including diaries, to put the statutory
evolution into its social context. Her holistic approach is particu-
larly helpful in her analysis of the effects of the 1671 Game Act and
preceding gun controls.
Although Great Britain should have been nearly totally dis-
armed by the end of Charles II's reign, and though strict property
50. P. 76. Residents of Washington, D.C. face a similar situation. They are effectively
forbidden from owning firearms for protection. Handguns are outlawed, except for guns
owned by city residents before 1976, and even long guns must be stored disassembled or
locked up, rendering them nearly useless for protection against a criminal who does not an-
nounce his intentions well in advance. D.C. CODE ANNu. §§ 6-2301 to -2380 (1981).
51. P. 75. Parallels might be drawn to modem efforts to outlaw various semiautomatic
firearms on the pretext that they are the "weapon of choice" of criminals, even though police
firearms seizure data show that they comprise only about one percent of crime guns. David
B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J. CoNTErMP. L. 381,
406-10 (1994) (citing police data from Akron, Baltimore County, Bexar County (San
Antonio), California, Chicago, Chicago suburbs, Connecticut, Denver, Florida, Los Angeles,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Miami, Minneapolis, Nashville, Newark, New Jersey, New York
City, New York State, San Diego, San Francisco, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.). Most so-
called assault weapons are rifles, which, like seventeenth-century muskets, are awkward to
carry and conceal for criminal purposes. The so-called assault pistols are also large and
bulky, and no more concealable in ordinary clothing than the oversized Black & Decker
power drills that they resemble. DAvID B. KoPn-, GuNs: WHO SHOULD HAvE THEM?
(forthcoming 1995).
52. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 120 (1984).
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qualifications for handguns dated back a century to the reign of
Henry VIII, firearms of all types, handguns included, were perva-
sive and easy to obtain. Civilians could buy illegally diverted mili-
tary equipment and other firearms on the black market, and even
legal guns were inexpensive enough for all but the very poorest to
purchase (p. 83). Moreover, most of the gentry chose not to en-
force the Game Act vigorously, choosing instead to use selectively
the right to search for weapons in order to deal with particular trou-
blemakers.5 3 Shooting matches involving illegal gun owners were
common, and many illegal gun owners made no effort to conceal
their possession of firearms (pp. 79-91).
Popular distrust of Charles II was founded not only on his en-
thusiasm for absolutism and his disdain for civil liberty, but also
upon the suspicion that he had secret Catholic sympathies, as
evinced by his failure to enforce most of the anti-Catholic laws even
as he vigorously persecuted Protestant dissenters. In fact, the King
may have secretly converted to Catholicism on his deathbed in 1685
(p. 93). His successor James Stuart, James II, was Catholic, had a
very Catholic wife, and was under great popular suspicion - quite
correctly - of plotting to disestablish the Anglican Church and re-
store Catholicism as the state religion (pp. 94-95).
Both local aristocrats and local militias supported Protestant up-
risings in Ireland and England. As James II suppressed the rebel-
lions, he moved further to build up a standing army that, on a per
capita basis, was as large as the one in France.5 4 The government
again brought foreign mercenaries into the country and resumed
the detested practice of billeting soldiers in private homes. To
make matters worse from the viewpoint of the Anglican majority,
King James II put a hundred Catholic officers at the head of this
53. P. 91. One study found the Game Act to be enforced mainly against persons whose
"crime" was not attending church. P. 199. n.92 (citing P.B. MuNsCm, GENTLEMEN AND
POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671-1831, at 213 (1981)).
54. Englishmen had long looked to French reliance on a professional army rather than a
popular militia as a major cause of French debility in general, and French tyranny in particu-
lar. For example, Sir John Fortescue had written:
Thai [the French peasants] gon crokyd, and ben feble, not able to fight, nor to defend the
realm; nor thai haue wepen, nor money to bie thaim wepen withall. But verely thai liven
in the most extreme pouertie and miserie, and yet dwellyn thai in on the most fertile
reaume of the worlde. Werthurgh the French kynge hath not men of his owne reaume
able to defende it, except his nobles, wich beyren non such imposicions, and ther fore
thai ben right likely of their bodies; bi wich cause the said kynge is compellid to make his
armeys and retenues for the defence of his lande of straungers, as Scottes, Spaynardes,
Arrogoners, men of Almeyn [Germans], and of other nacions, or ellis all his enymes
myght ouerrenne hym; for he hath no defence of his owne except his castels and for-
tresses. Lo, this is the fruit of jus reale. Yf the reaume of Englonde, wich is an Ile, and
therfor mey not lyghtly geyte souxore of other landes, were rulid under such a lawe, and
under such a prince, it wolde then be a pray to all other nacions that wolde conqwer,
robbe or deuouir it.
JoHN FoRTmScuE, THE GoVERNANCE OF ENGLAND: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN Auso-
LUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY 114-15 (rev. ed. 1885).
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vast standing army. At the same time, James II ordered the lords
lieutenant not to muster the militia, as the King attempted to de-
stroy the militia through disuse.55 The King enforced existing gun
laws with greater intensity than ever before. Royal forests having
long been "gun-free zones" - at least for ninety-nine percent of
the population - the King now empowered forest officers to
search for guns in homes up to ten miles away from forests.56
The 1328 Statute of Northampton had made it illegal to carry
firearms in the presence of royal officers, and to go armed "in Fairs,
Markets," and "elsewhere." 57 The statute had heretofore been
used solely against persons carrying arms for criminal purposes, but
James II now enforced it against anyone, other than government
employees, carrying a gun. Sir John Knight, a Protestant opponent
of the King, was brought to trial under the charge that he "did walk
about the streets armed." The case became a cause c6l~bre, all the
more so after a jury acquitted Knight (pp. 104-05).
Two weeks after Knight's acquittal, the King, finding the Statute
of Northampton an insufficient tool to enforce general disarma-
ment, ordered full enforcement of the Game Act of 1671. He also
ordered mass searches for firearms because "a great many persons
not qualified by law.., keep muskets and guns in their houses. '58
Perhaps because of lackadaisical enforcement by the lords lieuten-
ant, the King's order failed to disarm most of the public (pp. 105-
06).
55. Pp. 96-107. David Williams argues that the American government has essentially ac-
complished what Charles II attempted: destroying the militia through disuse. David C. Wl-
liams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101
YALE L. 551 (1991). He argues that when the Second Amendment was written, it was
presumed that people would be taught responsible gun ownership through participation in
the militia. In modem times, the government does not require militia training, and hence the
predicate condition for an individual right to arms in the United States has vanished. Id. at
590-96. His argument, though creative, would place in the American federal government the
power to disarm the populace, which was exactly the power that the authors of the Second
Amendment sought to deny. Moreover, grammatically speaking, the Second's Amendment's
"right of the people to keep and bear arms" is not dependent upon the introductory militia
language at the start of the sentence.
56. Pp. 89-90. Although allowed to hunt with guns, many aristocrats preferred other
forms of hunting. King James I told his son that "hare hunting, namely with running
hounds," was the "most honourable and noblest" form of hunting. In contrast, it was "a
thievish form of hunting to shoot with guns or bows." PATRICK M. MALONE, TmE SKULKiNG
WAY OF WAR: TECHNOLOGY AND TActics AMONG THE NEW ENGLAND INDIANs 53-54
(1991) (quoting JOSEPH STmrrr, THm SPORTS Am PASTImES OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND 5
(J. Charles Cox ed., 1903)).
57. The statute provided:
That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the King's Servants
in his Presence, and his Ministers... and also upon a Cry made for Arms to keep the
peace ... go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of
the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere ....
Statute of Northampton, 1328, 2 Edw. 3, ch. 3.
58. P. 105 (quoting Letter from the Earl of Sunderland to the Earl of Burlington (Dec. 6,
1686) in CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DoMEsnc SERIES, 1686-1687, at 314 (1964)).
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The Anglican religious establishment, with overwhelming public
support, grew bold and even brazen in resisting the King's efforts to
Catholicize the nation and his attempts to repeal the civil disability
laws that kept Catholics out of positions of power. Many Protes-
tants hoped that the King might die without a male heir, thereby
leaving his Protestant daughters Mary and Anne next in line for the
throne. Those hopes were shattered, however, when the Queen de-
livered a baby boy on June 10, 1688, and James II named the Pope
godfather (p. 110). Shortly thereafter, a secret committee invited
William of Orange, a Dutch prince, to invade England. He set sail
under English colors, with his ship bearing the motto "the Protes-
tant Religion and the Liberties of England" (pp. 110-11). William
made no claim on his own behalf, but called only for a free Parlia-
ment and a study of whether James II's new son really was a son or
had been smuggled into the birthing room in a warming pan. King
James II's professional and mercenary army collapsed and deserted
within a month after William had landed, and James II fled the
country. Barely a shot had been fired in the "Glorious Revolution"
(pp. 111-12).
IV. THE ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS
In January 1689, the "Convention Parliament" assembled. It in-
tended to select a new monarch, which it did by speedily recogniz-
ing William of Orange and his wife Mary, the Protestant daughter
of James II, as King and Queen. The Convention had a second pur-
pose, to ensure that the abuses of the preceding century never re-
curred, by drafting "a new magna charta."5 9
The Convention debates vented national frustration at the op-
pressions of previous monarchs. The Militia Act of 1662 had al-
lowed militia officers to disarm persons at their discretion. The
debaters attacked the Act not only for disarming the monarchy's
critics but also for perverting the militia from an instrument of pop-
ular sovereignty into an instrument of national absolutism. Speak-
ers discussed the necessity of possession of firearms for personal
defense, but discussion focused more on popular possession of arms
as a check against tyranny (pp. 114-16).
The "Convention Parliament" was really an ad hoc body, and it
knew that it did not have authority to legislate. Accordingly, the
Convention decided to limit itself to declaring and affirming ancient
rights, rather than enacting new legislation or repealing old legisla-
tion such as the Militia Act of 1662. For this reason, it was neces-
sary to characterize all the rights that the Convention affirmed as
59. P. 114 (quoting 2 GnBERT BuRNET, BISHOP BumNraT's HISTORY OF His OwN TIME
522 (1840)).
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"true, ancient, and indubitable," even though no statute before ever
formally recognized the right to arms (pp. 117-18).
The drafting committee soon provided a list of thirteen malig-
nant policies of James I, balanced by thirteen declarations of the
rights of British subjects. Items five and six of the monarchial
abuses read:
5. By raising and keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdome in
time of Peace without Consent of Parlyament.
6. By causing several good Subjects, being Protestants, to be
disarmed.6o
Items five and six of the Declaration of Rights read:
5. That the Raising or Keeping of a Standing Army within the King-
dom in time of Peace, unless it be with the Consent of Parliament, is
against Law.
6. That the Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide and keep
Arms, for their common Defence.61
The sixth item of the Declaration of Rights was amended, with no
opposition, to remove the reference to "common Defence" and to
add a qualifier. The final version read: "That the Subjects[,] which
are Protestants[,] may have Arms for their Defence[,] suitable to
their Conditions[,] [] as allowed by Law."62 The Convention
presented the Declaration of Rights to William and Mary the next
day, and it became law (pp. 118-19).
Although some modem American gun control advocates read
the Declaration of Rights as simply a "collective" right to partici-
pate in the militia, Malcolm details the implausibility of such a
claim. First, the militia does not even appear in the Declaration.
Second, the Convention struck the reference to "common De-
fence," replacing it with language that simply referred to defense.
The duty to defend the state had evolved into a right to have arms
for individual protection - including protection against the state
(pp. 119-20).
The qualifier to the sixth item of the Declaration of Rights -
"suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by law" - opened the
way for a host of restrictions short of total disarmament. Although
the historical record offers no help, Malcolm suggests that there
may have been an intention to keep Henry VIII's property qualifi-
cation for handgun ownership in force (pp. 119-21).
The government had enforced the Game Act of 1671 sporadi-
cally at best, despite royal commands. After enactment of the Bill
of Rights, justices of the peace enforced the earlier firearms provi-
sions only against poachers and not against people who simply pos-
60. P. 118 (quoting 10 H.C. JouR. 21 (1803)).
61. P. 118 (quoting 10 H.C. JouR. 22 (1803)).
62. P. 119 (quoting 10 H.C. JouR. 29 (1803)).
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sessed guns (p. 127). The Game Acts of 1692 and 1706 omitted
guns from the list of items that nonhunters were forbidden to
possess. 63
The Games Acts excluded Catholics - who were afflicted with
a civil status somewhat comparable to American communists in the
1950s - from the right to own a gun in light of their supposed
loyalty to a foreign potentate (p. 126). This exclusion, however,
does not negate the fact that Parliament recognized a right to arms
for the vast majority of Great Britain's population. Catholics com-
prised less than two percent of the population,64 and in practice,
they too were allowed to own defensive home firearms (p. 123).
The Convention Parliament's efforts to protect the rights of En-
glishmen to arms met with great success over the next centuries. By
the middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone, after describing
the three primary rights of Englishmen - personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and private property - then pointed to the five auxil-
iary rights that served to protect the primary ones:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present
mention, is that of having arms for their defence suitable to their con-
dition and degree, and such as are allowed by law.., and it is indeed
a public allowance under due restrictions, of the natural right of
resistance and self preservation, when the sanctions of society and
laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.65
Blackstone's treatise immediately became legal orthodoxy in Great
Britain and America. He wrote as if he were merely describing an
ancient common law right, rather than one that had come into for-
mal existence in 1689. Just as Blackstone had uncritically accepted
the Convention Parliament's claim that it was only recognizing old
rights, the Anglo-American legal community uncritically accepted
Blackstone - at least until Joyce Malcolm came on the scene.
Although the militia eventually withered into nothingness from
disuse and a peacetime standing army became normal in Great
Britain, the government recognized that the right to arms could be
exercised not just by lone homeowners faced with intruders but also
by groups. In 1780, after some riots, the Recorder of London -
63. Pp. 128-29. In 1739, a prosecutor had attempted to use the 1706 Act's prohibition of
"other engines" to convict a man, not accused of poaching, of simple gun possession. The
King's Bench agreed with the defense that "[a] gun differs from nets and dogs, which can
only be kept for an ill purpose, and therefore this conviction must be quashed." P. 129.
Ironically, according to the modem American gun control lobby, keeping a gun to defend
one's family against a violent felon is now "an ill purpose," whereas a gun kept for killing
animals for sport is a benign "sporting" instrument. According to Handgun Control, Inc.
Chair Sarah Brady, "The only reason for guns in civilian hands is for sporting purposes."
Tom Jackson, Keeping the Battle Alive, TAMPA Tnm., Oct. 21, 1993, (Bay Life Section), at 6.
64. J.R. JoNs, TxE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND 77 n.2 (1972).
65. 1 BLAcKSToNE, supra note 2, at *143-44.
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the city attorney - was asked if the right to arms protected armed
groups. He wrote:
The right of his majesty's Protestant subjects, to have arms for their
own defence, and to use them for lawful purposes, is most clear and
undeniable. It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of
this kingdom, not only as a right, but as a duty; for all the subjects of
the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at all
times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution
of the laws and the preservation of the public peace. And that right,
which every Protestant most unquestionably possesses, individually,
may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively, is likewise a
point which I conceive to be most clearly established by the authority
of judicial decisions and ancient acts of parliament, as well as by rea-
son and common sense.66
The right to arms became so commonly regarded as sacrosanct
that even Edward Gibbon, a Tory M.P. and close associate of King
George III - whose American governors were working hard to
disarm disobedient colonials - could remark that: "A martial no-
bility and stubborn commons, possessed of arms, tenacious of prop-
erty, and collected into constitutional assemblies, form the only
balance capable of preserving a free constitution against enterprises
of an aspiring prince."67
Although they should not, some may consider Malcolm's final
chapter, detailing the evolution of the 1689 British right to arms
66. Pp. 133-34 (quoting WnI.AM BuzA.D, DESULTORY REFLECIONS ON PoLIcE 59-60
(1785)). The U.S. Supreme Court came to a different conclusion a century later in Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). After violent government suppression of peaceful labor
strikes in Illinois in the 1870s, many workers began forming self-defense organizations such
as Lehr und Wehr Verein, a group for German immigrants. In response, the state government
outlawed private militias. Working people organized the private militias to protect them-
selves from governmental violence on account of their exercising their right to withhold their
labor, accordingly, these private militias, as defenders of private property against government
oppression, were doing exactly what the Second Amendment was intended to protect. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois ban on private militias on the grounds that
the Second Amendment - like the rest of the Bill of Rights under the Court's theory at the
time - was not enforceable against the states. For discussion of Presser's inconsistency with
the Second Amendment, see CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THm DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND
TmE STATE: THE ORIoNAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIOm- TO KEEP
AnD BEAR ARMs (1994).
The Court, in dicta, observed that even without the Second Amendment, the Constitution
protected individuals against being totally disarmed by their state governments because such
disarmament would interfere with federal militia powers contained in Article I, § 8:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved
military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view
of this prerogative of the general government ... the States cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question [the Second Amendment] out of view, prohibit the
people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their right-
ful resources maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing
their duty to the general government.
Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
67. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLIN AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 53 (Modern
Library ed. 1983) (1776-1978) (emphasis added).
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into the 1791 Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the
most controversial part of her book. The main body of the book
ought to be the portion that attracts controversy: In it Malcolm
argues that the 1689 Convention tricked the next three centuries of
Britons and Americans with its claim that the British right to arms
was "ancient, true, and indubitable," rather than fabricated on the
spot as a result of recent experience with oppressive monarchs and
their standing armies. Because Malcolm's thesis contradicts the
viewpoint of almost every scholar - pro-gun or anti-gun - who
has written anything on the British right to arms, one might expect
controversy. So far, however, no scholar has challenged Malcolm's
conclusion in print.
Malcolm's argument is, on the one hand, irrefutable, because
there is no known British legal document prior to 1689 that refers
to a right to arms; all the official documents call bearing arms a duty
rather than a right (p. 9). But, it is not impossible for a duty and a
right to coexist. Jury service was certainly a duty, but many Britons
also viewed it as "an ancient, true, and indubitable right. '68 It is
possible that deeper inquiry into medieval social history materials
might show a similar understanding of a duty-right to arms. While
the 1689 Convention may have fabricated a right in a strict legal
sense, some kind of rights consciousness regarding arms must have
existed beforehand, or else the Convention's assertion of an "an-
cient, true, and indubitable right" would have been so self-evidently
absurd as not to be worth asserting.
By analogy, the provision in the Declaration of Rights against
standing armies in times of peace was also novel, rather than "an-
cient," in that no statute had ever previously affirmed it nor had
any part of the common law in any known judicial opinion or legal
guidebook. Nevertheless, the declaration against standing armies
obviously reflected a long-standing, widely held view about how
Britain should organize its society - a viewpoint every monarch
had respected until the seventeenth century. Much the same might
be said about the right to arms: rights consciousness and statutory
affirmation of rights need not go hand in hand, particularly in light
of the English theory that the government does not "grant" rights,
but rather they arise by long-standing tradition from the ancient
past.
Consider, for example, if the U.S. Congress scrapped the volun-
teer army and replaced it with an army composed entirely of for-
68. The creeping, sometimes galloping, statism in twentieth-century Great Britain that
has reduced the right to arms to a small fragment of its former self has had a similarly de-
structive effect on other traditional British rights, including the right to jury trial and the right
to grand jury indictment. To a lesser degree, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, free-
dom of the press, and freedom from warrantless search and seizure have also suffered.
KOPEL, supra note 19, at 67-81.
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eign mercenaries. Is there any real doubt that there would be an
immense popular outcry and that many able-bodied, outraged
young men would insist that they had a "right" to serve in the
American army? From a strictly legal viewpoint, there is not and
never has been any "right" to join the army; but long-standing
American tradition makes it clear that the American army should
be composed of Americans and not foreign mercenaries. If one day
the American Constitution were amended to recognize a "right" of
the American people to an all-American army, that new right
would be both a legal novelty and a recognition of a "proto-right"
that had existed in the American tradition from time immemorial.
If Malcolm's book had delved more fully into the English political
and social history of the centuries from the Saxons to the Civil War,
a fuller exploration of the duty to arms that created some kind of
consciousness of a right to arms long before 1689 might have been
possible.
V. THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The part of To Keep and Bear Arms that will attract the most
popular attention is Malcolm's final chapter describing the evolu-
tion of the 1689 British right into the 1791 American Second
Amendment. Here, Malcolm provides a well-written summary that
offers almost nothing new to any student of the history of the crea-
tion of the Second Amendment. She concludes that Congress in-
tended the Second Amendment to recognize an individual right of
all free Americans to possess firearms. Congress designed the
Amendment to permit a militia drawn from the whole body of the
people, thus ensuring that a uniformed standing army would not be
the sole defense of the nation. Although Malcolm's conclusion may
startle some television commentators, it fits squarely within the
overwhelming scholarly consensus of the last fifteen years.69
69. See, eg., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMs, supra note 38; STEPHEN HALBRooK,
A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLs OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES (1989) [hereinafter HALBROoK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS]; LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMIns' CONSTITUTION 341 (1988); William Van Al-
styne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193
(1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution]; Robert J, Cottrol & Raymond
T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80
GEo. LJ. 309 (1991); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State:
Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 131 (1991)
[hereinafter Halbrook, The Right of the People]; Hardy, Armed Citizens, supra note 21;
Hardy, Second Amendment, supra note 21; Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 21; Don
B. Kates, Jr., Second Amendment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMEmCAN CONSTITUTION
1639 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Kates, Second Amendment]; Don B.
Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment A Dialogue, LAW & CoNrE'MP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at
143; Kates, Self-Protection, supra note 21; Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Lib-
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But Malcolm's final chapter, though uncontroversial - and al-
most trivial - from the viewpoint of modem Second Amendment
scholarship, is politically incorrect. The chapter caused one pub-
lisher to reject the book, while another publisher consented to pro-
duce the book only under the condition that the final chapter be
excised.70 Happily, Malcolm refused, and Harvard University Press
took the opportunity to publish a fine book of English legal history.
Regarding the American right to arms, Malcolm's evidence is
persuasive. The most useful parts of the chapter compare and con-
trast the Second Amendment with its British ancestor. For exam-
ple, the British right applied only to Protestants, a group that,
although it comprised the vast majority of the population, was a
narrower group than all the people. The Second Amendment, in
pointed contrast, recognizes a right that belongs to "the people."'71
Having traced the history of the demand for explicit constitu-
tional recognition of the right to keep and bear arms, Malcolm sum-
marizes events as the debate moved from the state ratifying
conventions and into Congress:
erty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L REv. 103 (1987); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The
Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTlNOS
CONSr. L.Q. 285 (1983); William Marina, Weapons, Technology, and Legitimacy: The Second
Amendment in Global Perspective, in FmEAums AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIc POLICY
417 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984); Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy,
Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1257 (1991); Shalhope, Armed
Citizen, supra note 21; Shalhope, Ideological Origins, supra note 21.
Notably, two articles that argue that the Second Amendment should no longer guarantee
an individual right concede that its original intent was to protect an individual right. David
Williams reasons that because governments have neglected their duties to promote responsi-
ble gun use through drill in a "well-regulated militia," the right to arms is no longer valid.
David C. Williams, supra note 55. Donald L. Beschle finds that the Amendment guarantees
an individual right of personal security, but suggests that the right can be protected by confis-
cating all guns. Donald L Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional
Protection for a Right of Security, 9 HA1LIuE L. REV. 69 (1986).
Articles stating that the Second Amendment confers no right on persons are: Cress,
supra note 21; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 21; Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the Negli-
gent Gun Owner, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 141 (1982); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the
Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 107 (1991); Warren Spannaus, State Firearms Regu-
lation and the Second Amendment, 6 HAmLnen L. REv. 383 (1983).
Forty-three state constitutions include their own right-to-bear-arms provision. See gener-
ally Robert Dowlut, Bearing Arms in State Bills of Rights, Judicial Interpretation and Public
Housing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 203 (1992); Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Consti-
tutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REv. 177 (1982).
One interesting piece of new scholarship argues that an individual right to own handguns
for personal protection can be found in the Federal Ninth Amendment. Nicholas J. Johnson,
Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth
Amendment, 24 RuTGFRs LJ. 1 (1992).
70. The author of the book being reviewed provided this information.
71. Pp. 136-37. In practice, if not in the formal text, the Second Amendment also ex-
cluded an important part of the population, because the Constitution generally considered
slaves to be beyond the protection of any part of the Bill of Rights. While late eighteenth-
century constitutional guarantees of arms, as well as state militia statutes, rarely excluded
free Blacks, such exclusions became more common in the nineteenth century. Cottrol &
Diamond, supra note 69, at 331-38.
The Right to Arms
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals,
each perceived as crucial to the maintenance of liberty. First, it was
meant to guarantee the individual's right to have arms for self-de-
fence and self-preservation. Such an individual right was a legacy of
the English Bill of Rights. This is also plain from American colonial
practice, the debates over the Constitution, and state proposals for
what was to become the Second Amendment. In keeping with colo-
nial precedent, the American article broadened the English protec-
tion. English restrictions had limited the right to have arms to
Protestants and made the type and quantity of such weapons depen-
dent upon what was deemed "suitable" to a person's "condition."
The English also included the proviso that the right to have arms was
to be "as allowed by law." Americans swept aside these limitations
and forbade any "infringement" upon the right of the people to keep
and bear arms.72
Malcolm notes, as Blackstone had observed, that the right to arms
was not merely for personal security against lone criminals but also
to allow popular resistance to a tyrannical government.73 And what
of that Militia Clause in the Second Amendment?
The second and related objective concerned the militia, and it is the
coupling of these two objectives that has caused the most confusion.
The customary American militia necessitated an armed public .... A
select militia was regarded as little better than a standing army. The
argument that today's National Guardsmen, members of a select mili-
tia, would constitute the only persons entitled to keep and bear arms
has no historical foundation. Indeed, it would seem redundant to
specify that members of a militia had the right to be armed. A militia
could scarcely function otherwise...
The clause concerning the militia was not intended to limit owner-
ship of arms to militia members, or return control of the militia to the
states, but rather to express the preference for a militia over a stand-
ing army.74
In other words, one of the reasons Congress guaranteed the right of
the people to keep and bear arms was so that a popular militia
could be drawn from the body of the people.75 The government
72. P. 162. Like the British Convention Parliament, the U.S. Congress rejected a clause
in the arms-rights guarantee that would have limited it to bearing arms "for the common
defense." P. 161.
73. P. 162. More precisely, Congress expected that a well-armed populace would be such
a deterrent to tyranny that the need to revolt would likely never arise.
74. Pp. 162-63. Richard Henry Lee had worried that if "one fifth or one eighth part of
the men capable of bearing arms be made a select militia," the select militia would rule over
the "defenseless" rest of the population. Therefore, wrote Lee, "the Constitution ought to
secure a genuine and guard against a select militia... to preserve liberty, it is essential that
the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when
young, how to use them." LTrr s FROM Tim FEDERAL FARMER To Tfm REPUBUiCAN 21-
22, 124 (Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (The author of the letters was originally anony-
mous but was later determined to be Lee.). Lee sat in the Senate that ratified the Second
Amendment. TmE iowrr To KEEP AND BEAR ARms, supra note 38, at 5.
75. If all this seems obscure today, it was hornbook law during the nineteenth century:
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would hence be able to rely more on a popular militia for protec-
tion and less on a standing army.
Malcolm notes the difficulties of an argument that the Second
Amendment, rather than guaranteeing a right of people to keep
and bear arms, actually guarantees only the right of state govern-
ments to maintain militias. First, the phrase "the people" in the
First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments is universally agreed
to refer to people, and not to state governments. It would be odd
indeed if the authors of the Bill of Rights consistently applied a
single meaning to "the people" throughout the Bill of Rights, but
anomalously used the phrase "the people" in the Second Amend-
ment to refer to state governments. 76
Malcolm is particularly effective in correcting the assertion that
Congress intended the Second Amendment to reassert state gov-
ernment authority vis-a-vis the federal government over the militia.
Malcolm notes that the body of the Constitution gave Congress au-
thority over the training and equipment of the militia - an author-
ity that Congress has virtually never exercised. 77 The Constitution
likewise gave Congress authority to call out the militia for specified
purposes.78 Although some anti-Federalists objected to the federal
militia powers, no single state-ratifying convention put forth an
amendment requesting that some of the power over the militia be
returned to the states (p. 163). Roger Sherman, recent research has
revealed, did draft an amendment to protect state authority over
The object of this clause [the right of the people to keep and bear arms] is to secure a
well-armed militia .... But a militia would be useless unless the citizens were enabled to
exercise themselves in the use of warlike weapons. To preserve this privilege, and to
secure to the people the ability to oppose themselves in military force against the usur-
pations of government, as well as against enemies from without, that government is for-
bidden by any law or proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and bear arms.
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNiTED
STATFS § 239, at 152 (New York, Hurd & Houghton 3d ed., rev. & enl. 1875).
76. P. 162. A majority of the Court adopted the common-sense suggestion that "the peo-
ple" has a consistent meaning throughout the Bill of Rights in a 1990 case involving the
Fourth Amendment:
"[T]he people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (regarding Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of nonresident nonnationals); see also Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Consti-
tution, supra note 69, at 1164 ("Thus, the 'people' at the core of the Second Amendment were
Citizens - the same 'We the People' who in conventions had 'ordain[ed] and establish[ed]'
the Constitution and whose right to reassemble in convention was at the core of the First
Amendment." (alterations in original)).
77. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the
Service of the Uiiited States." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
78. Congress has the power "[tjo provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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the militia, but the congressional committee reviewing the Bill of
Rights rejected it.79 As Stephen Halbrook observes, the "National
Guard" interpretation of the Second Amendment amounts to an
Orwellian reversal - to treating the enacted Amendment that
guarantees the right of the people as having a meaning identical to
a proposed but rejected amendment dealing with the rights of
states.80
Malcolm's chapter is not the definitive history of the origin of
the Second Amendment.8' She wisely chooses not to cover the
79. Pp. 160-63. Sherman's amendment stated:
The militia shall be under the government of the laws of the respective States, when not
in actual Service of the United States, but such rules as may be prescribed by Congress
for their uniform organization and discipline shall be observed in officering and training
them, but military Service shall not be required of persons religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms.
P. 160 (quoting ROGER SHERMAN, PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE BrL OF RIGHrs (1789)).
80. Halbrook, The Right of the People, supra note 69, at 131-32. Another piece of evi-
dence against the states' rights interpretation is James Madison's original structure of the Bill
of Rights proposed interpolating each Amendment into the text of the Constitution, follow-
ing the pertinent provision. Madison proposed putting the right-to-bear-arms amendment in
Article I, § 9, the section that guarantees individual rights, such as habeas corpus, rather than
in Article I, § 8, the section dealing with congressional powers over the militia. Kates, Sec-
ond Amendmen supra note 69.
The theory that the Second Amendment guarantees a right of state governments is dis-
cussed in Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States'
Rights: A Thought Experimen4 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 1995). The authors
note that commentators only used the "states' rights" theory of the Second Amendment to
counter attempts to raise the Second Amendment as an individual right. The proponents of
the states' rights theory have never bothered to explore exactly what rights the Second
Amendment must guarantee if the Amendment benefits states rather than individuals. As
Reynolds and Kates explain, the Second Amendment as a "state's right" must be the right of
states to maintain and arm state militias in contravention of federal authority. Id. Accord-
ingly, a state governor would have the authority within his state to negate existing federal
restrictions on ownership of machine guns, grenades, and surface-to-air missiles simply by
declaring that he wanted to arm the state militia with such weapons. Of course, militia mem-
bers would be expected to supply the weapons at their own expense through private
purchase, because state militias at the time of the Second Amendment were armed through
militiamen supplying their own weapons. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
Moreover, the current National Guard, if it is to be considered the "militia" protected by
the Second Amendment, must be unconstitutional in its current incarnation, because the
Guard is created under the federal government's army power, is armed by the federal gov-
ernment with guns that it can recall at will, and is subject to federalization and to being
shipped overseas at the unreviewable discretion of the President. Reynolds & Kates, supra.
The closer one looks at the "states' rights" theory of the Second Amendment, the less coher-
ent it becomes.
81. Readers in search of a fuller history of the Second Amendment should start with
Cramer's book, which provides a good analysis of the history of judicial interpretation of the
rights to keep and bear arms in both the Federal Constitution and in state constitutions.
CRAMER, supra note 66. Readers might then move to HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs,
supra note 69, which provides the best research regarding the period from the Revolutionary
War to the ratification of the Second Amendment. From there, readers should sample the
various law review articles listed in supra notes 21 and 69. The articles that tend to have the
most historical information are those by Cottrol and Diamond, Cress, Halbrook, Hardy, Ehr-
man and Henigan, Kates, and Shalhope. Halbrook's first book, That Every Man Be Armed,
was tremendously valuable at the time of publication in 1984, and it remains a useful one-
volume history; but, the historical research of the last ten years, including the new research
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same ground that has been well-trod in over fifty law review arti-
cles, all but a handful of which agree that the original intent of the
Second Amendment was to guarantee an individual right.8 2 Nor
does her book discuss the critical formative experiences of the
American frontier and the American Revolution in shaping the
American understanding of the importance of private arms in a free
and secure society.8 3 But her American chapter does effectively in-
tegrate her story about the evolution of the British right to arms
into an American context.
VI. MODERN ENGLAND
An Afterword briefly summarizes the rise and fall of the right to
arms in England in the last two centuries. The bearing of arms in
England began as a duty that was onerous in practice, but that in-
spired national pride in the abstract (pp. 1-3). As detailed by Mal-
cohn, the duty evolved into a formal legal right in 1689, in reaction
against oppressive weapons laws imposed by absolutist monarchs
(pp. 113-19). The right thrived with little controversy for the next
one and a half centuries. After the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, Par-
liament passed the Six Acts to disarm rebels in particular areas.
The Six Acts met with furious opposition, though they were limited
in geographical scope, and expired in two years. For the rest of the
nineteenth century, Britain had no laws at all regarding the peace-
ful possession or carrying of firearms.84 The Whig historian
Thomas Macaulay reflected the consensus opinion when he ob-
served that the right of English subjects to arms was "the security
without which every other is insufficient."85
As the twentieth century opened, Britain had essentially no gun
laws and no gun crime.. The national crime rate was lower than
during any period before or since. World War I changed this situa-
tion. As Malcolm explains, the British government in the years im-
mediately following World War I no longer trusted the British
people. The Cabinet feared, in the words of one member, "Red
revolution and blood and war at home and abroad!"86 Parliament
by Halbrook, has fleshed out many issues that Halbrook only briefly addressed in That Every
Man Be Armed. HALBROOK, supra note 38.
82. See supra note 69.
83. One of the best treatments of the Americanization of arms practices of the English
colonists is MALONE, supra note 56; see also KOPEL, supra note 15, at 307-21.
84. Pp. 166-70. The one exception was an 1870 law requiring persons who carried hand-
guns outside the home to obtain a tax stamp at the post office. It was conceived of strictly as
a revenue measure and was not intended to interfere with people carrying guns. KOPEL,
supra note 15, at 70-71.
85. P. 169 (quoting THOMAS MACAULAY, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS, CONTRIE.
uTED TO THE EDINBURGH REVIEW 154, 162 (Leipzig, 1850)).
86. P. 171 (quoting 1 THOMAS JONES, WHrrmHAU. Dsin¢ 97 (Keith Middlemas ed.,
1969)).
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introduced a licensing system for handguns and rifles, and made
knowingly false claims about a gun crime wave. Parliament over-
whelmingly enacted the Firearms Act of 1920,87 with little objection
from a public that, after the carnage of World War I, had apparently
grown weary of firearms and all they had now come to symbolize
(p. 172). Parliament adopted shotgun licensing in 1967 and made
the entire gun control system significantly more restrictive in
1989.88
The story of the twentieth-century devolution of the British
right to own guns to overthrow the government into a mere privi-
lege to possess "sporting" guns under highly restrictive government
controls has been told elsewhere,8 9 and Malcolm wisely does not
choose to repeat it.
The gun-owning public in Britain - about four percent of
households legally own guns, and about an equally large number
may own unregistered guns90 - has become almost irrelevant to
the gun control debate. With the exception of some writers for
British gun magazines, few Britons will assert that they have a right
to own.firearms as an insurance policy against oppressive govern-
ment. Few will even assert that they have a right to own guns to
protect themselves against criminal attack.
VII. MODERN AMERICA
To an English audience then, Malcolm's description of the de-
velopment of the right to arms may seem as distant and quaint, and
barbaric, as would a law journal's analysis of the right of utfangthef
- a Saxon lord's right to hang a thief caught with stolen goods.
Does the Malcolm book have any greater significance in America
where many millions of people still believe in the principle of the
British Declaration of Rights - that the ultimate purpose of gun
ownership is to resist the government?
First, the book suffers from one major flaw that may limit its
appeal to an American audience. Too often Malcolm falls on the
wrong side of the dividing line between a monograph and a book.
With only 177 pages of text, plus copious endnotes and a good in-
dex, To Keep and Bear Arms modestly focuses on presenting the
author's excellent original research.91 But even if Malcolm had lit-
87. Firearms Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 43 (Eng.).
88. KOPEL, supra note 15, at 75-85.
89. GREENWOOD, supra note 20; KOPEL, supra note 19; KoPEL, supra note 15.
90. KOPEL, supra note 15, at 89-90.
91. At least in the academy, the gun control debate has made great progress to a more
scholarly plane in the last several years. Scholars now have access to an excellent survey and
analysis of all the social science evidence regarding guns and gun control, GARY KrLcK,
Poncr BLANK (1991) (winner of the 1993 American Society of Criminology's Michael Hinde-
lang Award, as the most significant contribution to criminology in the last three years); an
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tie new to present, the literature still could have benefited from a
more detailed presentation and analysis of weapons policy in Eng-
land from Saxon times up through the English Civil War. Had Mal-
colm chosen to deal with this period in two or three chapters, rather
than in one, she might have better illuminated the attitudes that
helped make the duty to bear arms evolve into a right to bear arms.
Malcolm writes the book as if the intended audience were
mostly scholars of English legal history. She makes references to
events such as the Popish Plot,92 Thomas Venner's rebellions, 93 and
the Treaty of Ryswick94 without explanation, as if such events were
as much a part of common knowledge as Pearl Harbor or the Nina,
the Pinta, and the Santa Maria. Such events are common knowl-
edge among historians of.England, but Malcolm's book will be read
not only by professional historians but also by American generalists
who are interested in the modem gun control debate;95 unless these
generalists have at least a rough sense of seventeenth-century Eng-
lish history, especially the Civil War period, some passages of To
Keep and Bear Arms may seem opaque.
Does Malcolm's book help us answer any particular questions in
the modem American gun control debate? To at least some de-
gree, the English history helps illuminate the Second Amendment's
background. The 1689 Bill of Rights was a reaction against a long
string of encroachments by Charles II and James II: gun registra-
tion, gun owner registration, disarmament of political or religious
"malecontents, fanatics, and sectaries," 96 disarmament of the poor
and middle class through property qualifications, and placement of
law enforcement under centralized national control. All of these
infringements, which helped cause the overthrow of a king, have
rather obvious parallels in the agenda of the modem gun prohibi-
tion lobby. It is hard to believe that the people who put the Second
Amendment in the American Constitution - and parallel provi-
sions in most state constitutions - would classify as "reasonable
regulation" the very infringements that their English forebears had
explosion of law review articles and books analyzing the Second Amendment, see supra notes
21 & 69; a complete documentary collection of all known writings relevant to the origins of
the Second Amendment, from 1787 to 1792, THE OmOIN OF Ta SECOND AMENDMENT
(David E. Young ed., 1991); and a three-volume series that collects the most important cases
and articles related to the right to arms, GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION (Robert J.
Cottrol ed., 1993).
92. P. 95. The Popish Plot was a purported Catholic attempt to assassinate Charles II.
Although the plot was a fictitious creation, it aroused a frenzy of anti-Catholic persecutions.
93. Pp. 38,44,99. Venner was a Puritan rebel whose unsuccessful uprising prompted pro-
standing army sentiment.
94. P. 124. This 1697 Treaty, among other things, recognized William III as the legitimate
King of England.
95. Within a few months of publication, the book was in its third printing.
96. See supra note 60.
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found so intolerable and that indeed were justification for over-
throwing the government.
Although Malcolm's book suggests that the Framers of the Sec-
ond Amendment would have looked critically at gun registration
proposals, the book does not, and cannot, offer us James Madison's
thoughts on gun registration; nor can it connect those thoughts to
Madison's knowledge of British gun controls of the preceding cen-
tury. Not surprisingly, the difficulties of relying on original intent
become greater and greater as one attempts to make the intent
more and more specific.
But what was the general intent of the Second Amendment?
Here Malcolm demonstrates convincingly that the intent was to
guarantee an individual right to possess firearms for personal secur-
ity, so that the people could use firearms against both lone criminals
and criminal governments. Although American scholars looking at
American evidence have already arrived at a consensus supporting
this position, Malcolm's careful tracing of the antecedent British
right to keep and bear arms provides further validation for this
view.
Perhaps Malcolm's greatest contribution is to remind us that the
right to bear arms, in both its British and American contexts, is not
primarily about shooting sports or hunting. It is primarily about the
power relationship between people and government and about en-
suring that government cannot overpower the people.
The core right protected by the Second Amendment is the right
of the people to resist a tyrannical government and to secure for
themselves "a free state." The Second Amendment recognizes the
same reality as Mao Zedung's statement "Political power grows out
of the barrel of a gun.",97 The underlying objective of the Framers,
however, was precisely the opposite of Mao's; the Framers wanted
ultimate power to belong to the people and not the government.
Original intent is generally a starting point rather than a conclu-
sion for American constitutional debate, as Malcolm recognizes,
and she writes as a legal historian, not as an authoritative inter-
preter of the Second Amendment in the twentieth century. Still,
she warns that "to ignore all evidence of the meaning and intent of
one of those rights included in the Bill of Rights is to create the
most dangerous sort of precedent, one whose consequences could
flow far beyond this one issue and endanger the fabric of liberty"
(p. 176). "We are not forced into lockstep with our forefathers,"
Malcolm concludes, "[b]ut we owe them our considered attention
before we disregard a right they felt it imperative to bestow upon
us" (p. 177). It is one thing to say that original intent need not be
97. Tim OXFoRD BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 446 (4th ed. 1992).
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the only interpretive tool; it is quite another to say that original
intent and the text of the Constitution can be brushed aside by a
judge's sociopolitical determination that the very rights the Second
Amendment was intended to secure are no longer important. Such
judicial fiat creates not a "living Constitution," but a dead one, an
empty shell that provides American citizens no rights that black-
robed Platonic philosophers are bound to respect.98
Unlike King James II, the government in Washington is not at-
tempting to impose a state religion on a recalcitrant population.
Yet, in part as a result of the "war on drugs," the size of the federal
law enforcement establishment is the largest in history, and the in-
creasingly large federal and state law enforcement bodies are better
armed and more militarized than ever before. It was not too long
ago that the F.B.I. used tanks to launch an attack with chemical
weapons banned from international warfare against religious "mal-
contents, fanatics, and sectaries" - including two dozen children
- in Waco, Texas, who wanted only to be left alone.99 Have Amer-
ican politicians become so virtuous that the temptations of power
that enthralled their British counterparts of the seventeenth century
need not worry modern Americans? Or are the human frailties
that convinced Britain in 1689 that the right to arms was a necessary
caution against the dangers of government out of control still pres-
ent today?
Joyce Malcolm does not answer these questions in To Keep and
Bear Arms. She does remind us that the reason that the people of
Britain in 1689 and America in 1791 bequeathed to us the right to
keep and bear arms was not so that we could hunt game, but so that
we could stay free.
98. According to the Dred Scott decision, free Blacks had "no rights which the white man
was bound to respect" Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). To rein-
force the Court's opinion in Dred Scott that free blacks had no constitutional rights, Chief
Justice Taney conjured a parade of horribles that would result from recognizing free Blacks
as citizens. Among the rights of citizens Taney thought Blacks must be denied was the right
to "to keep and carry arms wherever they went." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 417.
The judicial history of the right to keep and bear arms in the United States is not the
subject of this essay. But it should be noted that for well over 150 years, some American
courts have been just as willing as Chief Justice Taney to perform intellectual pyrotechnics -
sometimes dishonestly - to avoid judicial enforcement of the right to keep and bear arms.
See CRAMER, supra note 66.
99. See generally DAVID KOPEL & PAUL BLACKmAN, Trm GOD WHo ANSWERS By FIRE:
THE WACO DISASTER AND THE NEcEssrrY OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JuSTIcE REFoRM
(forthcoming 1995).
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